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The main objective of the 2004 European Election Study (EES) was to assess 
the effect of the 2004 enlargement on the legitimacy of the European 
Union1.  
 Basically, there are two different methods for assessing the legitimacy of 
a political system. First, by evaluating the political system against criteria 
derived from normative theory. Secondly, by assessing to what extent the 
political system is right in the eyes of the beholders, i.e. the members of a 
particular polity. In the 2004 EES we did both, but in this paper I limit 
myself to the first method. In order to apply this method, it is necessary to 
elaborate a normative theory and then to specify criteria against which 
political reality can be evaluated. In our study we developed a set of criteria 
with regard to three dimensions of legitimacy: Identity, representation and 
accountability, and performance. Here I limit myself to the representation 
aspect.  
 In most contemporary theories of democracy, democracy is tantamount 
to electoral democracy. Of course, the idea of electoral democracy has been 
developed in the context of the nation-state and it is still a matter of dispute 
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whether it is applicable to the European Union. At least the Treaty on 
European Union as amended in the Lisbon Treaty of 2007 leaves little room 
for doubt. In article 10, the principle of representative democracy at the 
European level, with a key role for European political parties, is explicitly 
recognized:  
1. The functioning of the Union shall be founded on representative 
democracy. 
2. Citizens are directly represented at Union level in the European 
Parliament. 
3. Member states are represented in the European Council by their 
Heads of State or Government and in the Council by their 
governments, themselves democratically accountable either to their 
national Parliaments, or to their citizens. 
4. Political parties at European level contribute to forming European 
political awareness and to expressing the will of citizens of the 
Union2. 
 In this article two different channels of political representation are 
recognized. In addition to the national channel, ‘Citizens are directly 
represented at Union level’.  
 In contrast to the national level, the necessity of a full blown system of 
representative democracy at EU level is still a matter of dispute. There is an 
ongoing debate in the literature on the question whether or not electoral 
democracy at the European level is needed. Different answers to that question 
are related to different views on the kind of organisation the European Union 
is and to different normative views on democracy. This is not the place to 
review this literature, but once one accepts the argument that electoral 
democracy at the level of the EU is needed, one can specify more specific 
criteria against which the daily practice of EU politics can be evaluated.  
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 The view on representative democracy expressed in the treaty is 
remarkably consistent with the model of party government, the dominant model 
of political representation in the political science literature. According to this 
model, elections can function as an instrument of democracy when the 
following requirements are met3: 
1. Voters do have a choice, i.e. they can choose between at least two 
parties with different policy proposals. 
2. Voters do vote according to their policy preferences, i.e. they choose 
the party that represents their policy preferences best.  
3. The internal cohesion of parliamentary parties is sufficient to enable 
them to implement their policies.  
4. The party or coalition of parties winning the elections takes over the 
government. 
 It might be obvious that this is a set of stringent and perhaps unrealistic 
requirements – even at the national level - but they offer a useful conceptual 
framework to evaluate the effectiveness of the process of political 
representation in any polity.  
 According to the dominant political science literature, none of these 
essential requirements of the process of political representation operates 
effectively at the European level. First, despite the increased - and perhaps 
underestimated - powers of the European parliament, it does not form and 
control a European government, for the simple reason that there is no such 
thing as a European government, at least not in any traditional sense of the 
concept. Therefore, it hardly needs to be argued that at least one requirement 
of the system of party government, the formation and control of the 
government by a majority in parliament, is not met.  
 In our study we focus on how well the remaining requirements of the 
model of party government are met, i.e. the requirements referring to 
political parties and voters, both before and after enlargement.  
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 The traditional verdict on this process is hardly less negative. According 
to the party government model, political parties are supposed to supply 
different policy platforms for the voters to choose from. At the European 
level this does not occur. European political parties as such do not compete 
for the votes of a European electorate. European elections are still the arena 
of national political parties which compete mainly on national issues. Also, 
voters make their choice on the basis of their opinions on national issues and 
their perception of the position of national political parties on these issues. As 
a consequence, European elections fail as an instrument of democracy at the 
European level, i.e. they fail to express the will of the European people on 
European issues, i.e. issues with regard to the process of European integration 
itself.    
 The remedy, according to some observers, is for political parties to 
organise themselves at the European level and try to win elections on 
European rather than national issues. However, as argued before,4 this 
argument is disputable. The idea that elections for the European Parliament 
should be campaigned for on so-called European issues is based on a 
fundamental misunderstanding. Formal decisions on a further transfer of 
sovereignty from the national to the European level and on enlargement are 
subject to the intergovernmental regime of European decision-making. They 
need the consent of national governments and are, at least in principle, under 
the control of national parliaments and national electorates. Therefore, the 
interesting paradox is that what usually are called European issues are basically 
national issues. As far as the existing party system fails to offer a meaningful 
choice to the voters, this is a problem at the national rather than the 
European level.5  
 Therefore, the crucial test for the effectiveness of the European system 
of political representation is the extent to which it is effective with regard to 
more substantive policy areas where the European Parliament is competent. 
However, this argument can hardly change the verdict on the European 
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system of political representation. It is still true that European political parties 
as such do not compete for the votes of a European electorate, that European 
elections are run by national political parties and mainly on national issues, 
that voters make their choice on the basis of their opinions on national issues.  
This, however, does not necessarily mean that European elections fail as an 
instrument to ‘express the will of the citizens of the Union’. Once we accept 
the argument that the European level of governance is mainly responsible for 
substantive rather than constitutional issues there is no reason to assume that 
issues on the European agenda are very different from the policy agendas at 
the national level. Quite the contrary, the effectiveness of a European system 
of political representation depends on its ability to aggregate and integrate 
national political agendas and the national cleavage structures at the European 
level. The major challenge for an effective democratic political system at the 
European level is to overcome the traditional dividing lines in Europe, the 
national borders. The more political differences coincide with national 
borders, the more disruptive is the politicization of these differences. But the 
more political parties base their policy appeals on cross-national cleavages 
rather than on national interests, the better they can serve their function of 
‘expressing the will of citizens of the Union’. 
 
Even though there is not much of a process of political representation at the 
European level, elections for the European parliament – following the 
requirements of the party government model - might still serve this function 
if:  
a) Political parties of the same party family across member states develop 
similar party manifestos and profiles during their election campaigns;  
b) Their voters across Europe have similar policy priorities and vote 
according to similar considerations; 
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c) Being a member of a particular party group rather than national 
background defines the policy views and the roll call behaviour of 
members of the European Parliament.  
 Previous research has shown that these requirements are amazingly well 
met. The compatibility of national party systems is surprisingly high due to a 
roughly similar cleavage structure across Western Europe. The manifestos of 
parties of the same party family are strongly constrained by the same 
ideological dimensions and in particular by the left-right dimension. Members 
of the European Parliament are organised in political groups rather than in 
national delegations, whereas roll call votes can be explained to a large extent 
by their positions on the left-right dimension. Other dimensions such as the 
pro-anti-European integration dimension are only of minor importance.  
 In all countries of the European Union the left-right position is 
amongst the most significant factors explaining party choice and the effect of 
left-right is about the same in all countries. In this sense, one might speak of 
‘a single European electorate’. As a consequence, the left-right dimension is a 
suitable vehicle for meaningful mass-elite communication across the 
European Union and the system of political representation at the European 
level is functioning much better than often assumed. Despite the lack of a 
process of political representation at the European level, the aggregation of the 
outcomes of national processes still leads to reasonable policy congruence 
between Party Groups in the European Parliament and their electorates across 
Europe, at least on policy issues related to the left-right dimension.  
 However, most of the empirical evidence sustaining this conclusion is 
based on research conducted before the 2004 enlargement. It was still to be 
seen whether the new post-communist parties and their voters were 
sufficiently similar to their West European counterparts to fit into the existing 
party system. If they were not it would no longer be possible to aggregate the 
national cleavage systems and the national systems of political representation 
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into an effective process of political representation at the European level. The 
dominance of the left-right dimension in most West-European democracies is 
generally attributed to certain historical commonalities, in particular the 
industrial revolution. Eastern European party systems are of much more 
recent origins and the nature and relevance of cleavages in these countries is 
still not totally clear. Therefore, there was a serious concern that the political 
parties and the dimensions of contestation in these countries would not fit in 
the existing European party system.      
 The findings of our project strongly suggest though that the inclusion 
of the post-communist countries into the European Union did not produce a 
fundamental change in the left-right structuring of either voting behaviour or 
the party system. Just like in the older member states, left-right is by far the 
most important factor structuring the voting behaviour of the electorate in 
the new member states. Therefore, the idea of a single European electorate, 
primarily motivated by the same left-right dimension, can still be sustained. 
However, this is not to say that there are no differences. The effect of left-
right orientations on party choice is significantly weaker in the new member 
states in Central and Eastern Europe than in the older member states. Also, 
citizens in Central and Eastern Europe in general tend to differ greatly from 
the citizens of the established European democracies on a number of issues: 
They are more egalitarian, anti-immigrant and socially conservative than 
West Europeans. Hence, even though the differences between the voters of 
different parties follow the same pattern in new and old member states, at the 
electoral level the East-West differences within the party groups are in a few 
cases even larger than the differences between them. This means that although 
the left-right dimension still is a suitable vehicle for mass-elite 
communication across the European Union, the issue space that needs to be 
represented by a single European Party Group is further stretched (Van der 
Brug et al. 2008).  
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 A similar conclusion can be drawn with regard to the development of 
the European party system. The 2004 enlargement hardly had an effect on it. 
An analysis of party manifestos and expert judgments leads to the conclusion 
that the parties from the new member states fit very well in the existing party 
system and do not seriously affect the cohesiveness and distinctiveness of the 
party groups. With or without the new members, the party groups in the 
European Parliament look very much the same (Schmitt and Thomassen 
2008). This is largely confirmed by an analysis of roll calls in the European 
Parliament since 2004. The left-right divide is by far the most important 
dimension explaining roll call behaviour, just like it has been before 
enlargement (Voeten 2008).  
 Nevertheless, there are indications of an increase of latent tensions 
within the major party groups. Just like the voters from Central and Eastern 
European countries, MEPs representing them tend to be less libertarian and 
more traditional or authoritarian than their colleagues from Western Europe. 
In particular the PES, the socialist party group, has become less cohesive in 
this respect. But as a general conclusion we can still maintain that the 2004 
enlargement had less effect on the effectiveness of the European system of 
political representation than often expected.  
 This does not at all mean though that the 2004 enlargement did not 
have an effect on the legitimacy of the EU. As explained above, 
representation is only one dimension we took into account in our study of 
legitimacy. The effect of enlargement on the dimension of identity e.g. is a 
totally different story. Whatever illusions one might have about the 
development of a European identity or the sense of a European political 
community, this development has suffered a serious drawback because of 
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